🖋️ The Crucible of Ratification • 1787 to 1788
How the States contested, negotiated, and ultimately ratified the Constitution—and how the intense debate over presidential tyranny forced the creation of the Bill of Rights.
Documents: 6 Historic Records • Key Debaters: Madison, Washington, Hamilton, Patrick Henry
September 17, 1787 • Independence Hall, Philadelphia George Washington, President of the Federal Convention
George Washington's Transmittal Letter to Congress
The official cover letter accompanying the newly engrossed Constitution sent to the Continental Congress, emphasizing that individual states must surrender a portion of their sovereignty to preserve the general interest.
"It is obviously impracticable in the foederal government of these States; to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all--Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest."
Sir, We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which has appeared to us the most adviseable.
The friends of our country have long seen and felt, that the power of calling forth the undivided resources of the entire union, and directing them by one common will, was essential to our safety, and to our prosperity at home and abroad. It is obviously impracticable in the foederal government of these States; to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all--Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the present occasion this difficulty was encreased by a difference among the several States as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular interests.
In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each State in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected; and thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensible.
That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless consider, that had her interests alone been consulted, the consequences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we hope and believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish.
With great respect, We have the honor to be, Sir, your Excellency's most obedient and humble servants. By unanimous Order of the Convention.
GEORGE WASHINGTON, President.
His Excellency the President of Congress.
February 6, 1788 • Boston, Massachusetts Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (John Hancock, Samuel Adams)
The Massachusetts Compromise & Ratification Resolution
The decisive turning point in constitutional ratification. Confronting fierce Anti-Federalist opposition, Governor John Hancock proposed immediate ratification paired with formal recommended amendments protecting state powers and personal liberties, establishing the precedent that produced the Bill of Rights.
"The Convention do accordingly recommend that the following Alterations and Provisions be introduced into the said Constitution... First, That it be explicitly declared that all Powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several States."
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1788.
The Convention having impartially discussed, & fully considered the Constitution for the United States of America, reported to Congress by the Convention of Delegates from the United States of America, & submitted to us by a Resolution of the General Court of the said Commonwealth, passed the twenty fifth day of October last past, and acknowledging with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe in affording the People of the United States, in the course of his Providence, an Opportunity, deliberately & peaceably without fraud or surprize of entering into an explicit & solemn Compact with each other by assenting to & ratifying a New Constitution in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure Domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to themselves & their posterity; Do in the Name and in behalf of the People of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts assent to & ratify the said Constitution for the United States of America.
And as it is the opinion of this Convention that certain alterations & provisions would remove the fears & quiet the apprehensions of many of the good people of the commonwealth & more effectually guard against an undue administration of the Federal Government: The Convention do accordingly recommend that the following Alterations and Provisions be introduced into the said Constitution.
First, That it be explicitly declared that all Powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several States to be by them exercised.
Secondly, That there shall be one representative to every thirty thousand Persons according to the Census taken by virtue of the Constitution until the whole number of the Representatives amounts to Two hundred.
Thirdly, That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them by the fourth Section of the first Article, but in cases when a State shall neglect or refuse to make the Regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations subversive of the rights of the People to a free & equal Representation in Congress agreeable to the Constitution.
Fourthly, That Congress do not lay direct Taxes but when the Monies arising from the Impost & Excise are insufficient for the Publick exigencies...
June 25-27, 1788 • Richmond, Virginia Virginia Ratifying Convention (Madison vs. Patrick Henry & George Mason)
Virginia Ratification Resolution and Proposed Bill of Rights
The most celebrated ideological collision of the Founding. Following epic oratorical debates between James Madison and Patrick Henry over presidential tyranny and federal sovereignty, Virginia ratified 89 to 79 while proposing a comprehensive 20-article Declaration of Rights and 20 constitutional amendments that directly shaped the federal Bill of Rights.
"There are some rights so fundamental that no government may abridge them... That the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the People of the United States, may be resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression."
Virginia, to wit:
We the Delegates of the People of Virginia duly elected in Pursuance of a Recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Convention... Do in the Name and in behalf of the People of Virginia declare and make known that the Powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the People of the United States may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression and that every Power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will: that therefore no right of any denomination can be cancelled abridged restrained or modified by the Congress by the Senate or House of Representatives acting in any Capacity by the President or any Department or Officer of the United States except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes: & that among other essential rights the liberty of Conscience and of the Press cannot be cancelled abridged restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.
With these impressions with a solemn appeal to the Searcher of hearts for the purity of our intentions and under the conviction that whatsoever imperfections may exist in the Constitution ought rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein, than to bring the UNION into danger by a delay... We the said Delegates in the name and in behalf of the People of Virginia do by these Presents assent to and ratify the Constitution recommended on the seventeenth day of September one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven by the Foederal Convention...
Virginia Recommended Bill of Rights Highlights:
1. That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot divest or alienate their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
2. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are therefore their trustees and agents, at all times amenable to them.
3. That the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.
4. That no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services.
July 26, 1788 • Poughkeepsie, New York New York Ratifying Convention (Alexander Hamilton, Melancton Smith, George Clinton)
New York Ratification and Circular Letter to the Governors
Facing a hostile Anti-Federalist majority, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay secured ratification by a narrow 30-to-27 vote only by attaching an extensive Declaration of Rights and issuing an urgent Circular Letter unanimously urging a Second Constitutional Convention to adopt immediate amendments.
"Our deliberations have ended in a resolution to ratify the Constitution in the firm expectation of early amendments... several articles in it appear so exceptionable to a majority of us, that we think it our indispensable duty to propose a general convention."
The Circular Letter, from the Convention of the State of New York to the Executives of the different States.
Poughkeepsie, July 28, 1788.
Sir, We, the members of the Convention of this State, have deliberately and maturely considered the Constitution proposed for the United States. Several articles in it appear so exceptionable to a majority of us, that nothing but the fullest confidence of obtaining a revision of them by a General Convention, and an invincible reluctance to separating from our sister States, could have prevailed upon a sufficient number to ratify it, without stipulating for previous amendments.
We think it our indispensable duty to make this declaration, and to submit to you our opinion, that a matter so interesting to the peace and general welfare of our country, ought to receive the earliest and most serious attention. We take the liberty of suggesting, that a General Convention may easily be called, under the authority of the fifth article of the proposed Constitution...
Our reasons for proposing this measure, will, we hope, appear satisfactory to our sister States. The Constitution is a system of government in many respects novel; its operations must be in a degree experimental; and it would be strange indeed, if defects should not appear in it. Many of the most essential rights of the citizens are not secured by a Bill of Rights; and the powers of the federal government are in many instances undefined and ambiguous.
By Order of the Convention,
GEORGE CLINTON, President.
March 14, 1788 • New York Alexander Hamilton ('Publius')
Federalist No. 69: The Real Character of the Executive
Hamilton's masterwork on the scope and limits of presidential power. Publius systematically contrasts the American President with the British Monarch and the Governor of New York, demonstrating that the President possesses neither hereditary immunity, absolute veto, unilateral treaty power, nor the power to declare war or raise armies.
"The President of the United States would be an officer of four years' duration, like the governor of New York... The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and inviolable."
To the People of the State of New York:
I proceed now to trace the real character of the proposed executive, as it is portrayed in the plan of the convention; for this will serve as the best answer to the unfair and exaggerated exaggerations which have been propagated on that subject.
The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the deputy of New York, to the president of Pennsylvania, and to the chief magistrate of other States.
The President of the United States would be an officer of four years' duration, like the governor of New York; while the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary monarch. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and inviolable.
The President would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution.
The President is to have power to return a bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, for reconsideration; but he ought not to have power to negative it entirely. The king of Great Britain, on the other hand, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of parliament...
The President is to be the 'commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.' He is to have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. The king of Great Britain is also commander-in-chief of the military forces by land and sea, and has the like power of granting pardons. But it will be seen at once that there is no comparison between the extent of these powers in the two cases. The President can only command such forces as may be provided and maintained by Congress. The king of Great Britain can raise and maintain armies at his pleasure...
March 15, 1788 • New York Alexander Hamilton ('Publius')
Federalist No. 70: The Executive Department Further Considered
Hamilton's foundational defense of a unitary executive. Hamilton argues that 'energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government,' necessary for the protection of the community against foreign attacks, steady administration of the laws, and security of liberty against faction.
"Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws."
To the People of the State of New York:
There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles.
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy...
A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.
The ingredients which constitute energy in the executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.
The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people; secondly, a due responsibility.
Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor of a single executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to the single hand; while they have considered wisdom as the best qualification for the latter, and have regarded this as best calculated to be found in the multi-member assembly.